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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
consistent with the common law rule that a bailee's possessory interests
were suffcient to support trespass or trover.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the provisions of Section
4505.04 and the authority of Mielke v. Leeberson'9 necessitate a holding
that "the mere possession of an automobile no longer carries with it any
right or interest in that automobile which a court can recognize." Quaere:
is it now necessary in an action for damages to one's automobile to allege
in his petition therefor the existence of a Certificate of Tide in his name
and to prove the same on trial? It begins to appear so.
Fair Trade Law Weakened
Finally, in our discussion of significant cases in the Law of Sales in
Ohio during the year 1958, we note that the Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional 20 that Section of the Ohio Fair Trade Act2l which pro-
hibits those who are not parties to a price-fixing contract between the
producer of a trade marked commodity and another from selling such
commodity for less than the price stipulated in such contract.
Since the validity of such acts was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court22 in 1936, many states have followed that decision, but,
of course, they are by no means required to do so. The Ohio Supreme
Court got in line with what appears to be a growing majority. Citing
"the light of present day conditions," the "anticompetitive price fixing"
effect and "the constitutional right of the owner of property to dispose
of it as he pleases," the court held that Section 1333.06 "represents an
unauthorized exercise of the police power in a matter unrelated to the
public safety, morals or general welfare, delegates legislative power to
private persons ... and is invalid."
SAMUEL SONENFEILD
TAXATION
Jurisdiction
An ordinance of the City of Franklin, Ohio, enacted in 1957 sought
to impose an excise tax upon the use of water and sewage service pro-
vided by the city. It took the form of a tax of 50% of the amount of the
19. 150 Ohio St. 528, 83 N.E.2d 209 (1948).
20. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147
N.E.2d 481 (1958). Also discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section, supra and
TRADE REGULATIONS section, infra.
21. OMO REV. CODE § 1333.06.
22. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
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user's bill for water and sewage service. It was designed to provide
revenues for the General Fund of the City. A user refused to pay this
tax and an affidavit was prepared and warrant for arrest was issued.
Upon a demurrer to the affidavit charging the offense, the trial court'
held that the ordinance was invalid as contrary to the United States and
Ohio Constitutions, and the statutes of Ohio concerning the charges for
sewage and water services supplied by municipal corporations. The trial
court appears to have based its determination of invalidity upon three
primary grounds: (1) that this ordinance was an evasion of the 10 mill
limitation on property taxed according to value imposed -by Article XII,
Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution and -its implementing legislation;
(2) that it was a contravention of the statutes which prohibit the use
of sewage and water rental funds for general municipal purposes; 2 and
(3) that this ordinance denied equal protection of the laws to the resi-
dents of Franklin because the burden of the tax would fall upon users of
-these municipal services whereas the benefits would extend to all per-
sons, including persons who supplied their own water service, e.g., private
wells, to which the tax did not apply.
This decision is adverse to municipal fiscal policy, and if ultimately
affirmed, doses the limited excise tax field now considered available to
the municipal corporation. Briefly, the ordinance purports to levy an excise
tax on the consumer's use of two municipal services: sewage and water.
The method of using a percentage of the charge for commodity or ser-
vice used is orthodox.
The limitations of Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution
on the percentage of a municipal tax applies only to a tax on property
levied in accordance with value, and it need be uniform only as to real
property. The implementing statute applies the "10-mill limitation 3
to all taxable property levied on each dollar of tax valuation.4 Article XII,
Section 2, however, does not apply to the imposition of excise taxes under
Article XII, Section 10 and examples of such taxes include privilege and
occupation levies.5
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Hoefner v. City of Youngstown6
recognized that a municipal ordinance levying a percentage of the net
rate charged for gas, electrical energy, telephone service, and water is an
1. City of Franklin v. Harrison, 153 N.E.2d 467 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1957).
2. OHIO RLV. CODE §§ 729.52, 743.05.
3. OHIo REV. CODE § 5705.02.
4. Bennett v. Evatt, 145 Ohio St. 587, 62 N.E.2d 345 (1945) applied this rule to
intangible investments.
5. Saviers v. Smith, 101 Ohio St. 132, 128 N.E. 269 (1920).
6. Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
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excise tax. This ordinance imposed the tax upon the consumer and it
was to be added to his utility bill similarly to the scheme of collection
set out in the City of Franklin ordinance considered in the principal
case. The Youngstown ordinance was held invalid, however, because the
state legislature had already pre-empted the field.
It is settled law in Ohio that a municipality may levy and collect an
excise tax for local purposes so long as it -is not precluded -by state legis-
lation.7 There is no problem of pre-emption8 in the City of Franklin
situation. The state excise tax on9 gross receipts of public utilities which
invalidated the local excise tax on the City of Youngstown case does not
apply to utility services supplied by a municipal corporation.10 The
power to impose the excise on municipal sewer and water service charges
existed independently and apart from the limitations of Article XII, Sec-
tion 2 and implementing legislation. The passage of the ordinance was
not an evasion or circumvention of the "10-mill limitation."
Since the enactment of an excise tax for local purposes on the
privilege of using municipal sewer and water service is within the legis-
lative power of a municipal corporation, such an action does not repre-
sent a diversion of sewer and water rates contrary to statute. The or-
dinance -is truly an excise tax on the privelege of using a municipal ser-
vice whereas sewer and water rates are not taxes," though subject to
state regulation.12
The third basis for invalidity of the City of Franklin ordinance in
the opinion of the court was the denial of equal protection of the laws
under the 14th Amendment. A point is made of the fact that self-
suppliers of water are not taxed but will nevertheless be entitled to share
equally in the benefits of the general fund of the city along with the
users of the city water service. State and local governments have much
freedom in choosing the subjects of excise taxation, and the United States
Supreme Court has sustained classifications which have a reasonable
basis.1 3 Participation of persons in the benefits of tax proceeds who did
7. State, ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919); Haef-
ner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
8. There is an excellent analysis of this troublesome problem by Glander and
Dewey, Municipal Taxation- A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine, 9 OHIO ST.
LJ. 72 (1948).
9. OHIo REv. CODE § 5727.38.
10. OHIO REv. CODE, § 5727.05 exempts municipal corporations from making
any return or paying any excise or franchise tax of fee under ch. 5727.
11. In Alter v. Cincinnati, 56 Ohio St. 47, 67, 46 N.E. 69, 71 (1897), the opinion
states "water rents are not, strictly speaking, taxes, and certainly not taxes on property
to be regulated under article twelve of the Constitution."
12. Cincinnati v. Roettinger, 105 Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922).
13. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
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not share in the taxation which produced the public funds has not been
a basis for invalidating the tax on those who did. There appears to be
a reasonable basis for classification between users and non-users of
municipal water service.
While -it is true that Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution also
provides a guaranty of equal protection of the laws and it has been held
that this is an implied limitation on the imposition of excise and
franchise taxes, 14 the Ohio courts recognize that the legislative body has
wide discretion in classification for tax purposes, and that this discretion
will not be disturbed unless the classification attempted results -in so great
a discrimination against members of the same class as to deny them equal
protection of the laws.15
A court of appeals had no comparable difficulty in sustaining a
municipal admissions tax ordinance in Smack & Snack, Inc. v. City of
Mayfield Heights.1  It affirmed a judgment sustaining an amended
ordinance which specifically applied to "golf driving ranges," the ad-
mission charge applying only to the privilege of using the individual
bucket of golf balls. The state "admissions" tax had been repealed, thus
removing any direct pre-emption of the field, and there was no express
or implied limitation on the levying of excise taxes of -this character by
municipalities for the purpose of raising revenue for purely local pur-
poses.
Exemptions
Four Supreme Court decisions dealt with a variety of problems in-
cluding the exemption of federally owned real estate, of state owned real
estate occupied by structures which were designed for use by and used by
lessees operating concessions along the Ohio Turnpike, and of municipal
railway systems, and municipal off-street parking facilities.
In County of Franklin v. Lockbourne Manor, Inc.,17 the applicant for
tax exemption was a lessee of property which belonged to the United
States and which was operated as a housing development in connection
with the Lockbourne Air Force Base. The sole interest of the lessee was
its 75-year lease of the housing project, though under its lease it was
obligated to construct the buildings which became U.S. property. As soon
as the project was completed, the county auditor placed the real property
on the county tax duplicate, and the lessee applied for exemption. The
14. Southern Gum Co., v. Laylin, 66 Ohio St. 578, 64 N.E. 564 (1902).
15. State ex ret., Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N.E.2d 684 (1937); Gulf
Refining Co. v. Evatt, 148 Ohio St. 228, 74 N.E.2d 351 (1947).
16. 78 Ohio L Abs. 423, 149 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
17. 168 Ohio St 286, 154 N.E.2d 147 (1958) .
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Board of Tax Appeals found that the taxes upon the leasehold interest
were illegally assessed and granted the exemption. The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision, indicating that the United States could not be
taxed without its consent and that it had consented only that state and
local taxes could be levied on the lessee's interest created by leases under
the statute authorizing the construction of the project. Since the state
of Ohio has not attempted to tax leaseholds, no tax was properly levied.
In 1956, the Ohio Turnpike Commission requested the Board of Tax
Appeals to exempt all of its property along the entire length of the Turn-
pike from the tax lists and duplicates of the counties in which the toll
road is situated and for the remission of taxes and penalties for the
years 1954 and 1955. This request was granted in its entirety by the
Board. The auditor of Cuyahoga County appealed and specifically chal-
lenged the reasonableness and lawfulness of -the Board's findings that the
portions of the service plazas in Cuyahoga County leased or rented to
private corporations are used exclusively for turnpike purposes and there-
fore legally exempt from taxation. The decision necessarily turned
upon the general statute' 8 exempting state property used exclusively for a
public purpose and the special statute19 exempting the Turnpike Com-
mission from any taxes or assesments upon any turnpike project or upon
any property acquired or used by the Commission under its statutory
authority. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board and held that the
lease of facilities to private corporations which might derive a profit
from their operation did not change the controlling fact that the entire
project is owned by the public and is devoted essentially to an exclusive
public use.2°
In 1943, the City of Cleveland acquired its transit system and made
application for exemption of the real and personal property used in the
system. The Board of Tax Appeals granted the exemption, but on appeal
the Supreme Court reversed the Board, holding that there was a lack of
constitutional authority to exempt the real property and that the legisla-
ture had in fact not exempted the personal property.2' In 1957 the City
of Cleveland again made application to exempt from taxation the real
and personal property used by it in the operation of its mass transpor-
tation system. On the authority of the 1945 decision of the Supreme
Court, the Board of Tax Appeals denied the application. In doing this
the Board was relying upon an authority which the present majority of
18. OHIo Rnv. CODE § 5709.08.
19. Omo REv. CODE § 5537.20.
20. Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 167 Ohio St. 273, (1958).
21. Zangerle v. City of Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1945). See
discussion in MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs section, supra.
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the Supreme Court would not accept, for without material comment on
the intervening decisions of the Court, it reversed the Board.22 Thus
without expressly overruling its 1945 decision, the court in effect had
overruled the position taken in that instance. An important move in this
direction was taken in the Columbus "reservoir" decision23 which held
that land owned by the city which was used to contain water to be sold
and distributed by it to its residents and to the residents of its suburbs was
public property used exclusively for a public purpose. In the principal
case the court again holds that "public purpose" is not restricted to purely
governmental activities but includes proprietary undertakings. Since the
property for which exemption was requested was used solely for the mass
transportation of people in and around Cleveland, that was a use ex-
clusively for a public purpose even though a charge is made for the ser-
vice and a profit might result from the charge. It is significant that the
majority opinion states that, for tax exemption purposes, public-owned
mass transportation systems should be treated like other municipally
owned utilities, including waterworks, light and gas plants.
In the off-street parking exemption case argument before the Supreme
Court, the City of Columbus urged that the proprietary nature of the
enterprise did not take it out of the public purpose classification. The
Supreme Court agreed with this 4 position. It decided, however, that
the issue of tax exemption could not be determined under the general
exemption statute in this instance, but must be decided under the policy
of the special statute under which the legislature had authorized municipal
corporations to establish and operate off-street parking facilities. This
section expressly denied tax exemption to real estate acquired for the
operation of such parking facilities.2 5 It made no difference that the
City of Columbus had acquired this property under authorization of its
charter rather than under the state statute. A city may not avoid the
legislative policy against tax exemption of off-street parking facilities by
acquiring real property for an identical use in the exercise of its home
rule power, thereby attempting to claim exemption under the general
exemption statute.2 6
22. City of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 167 Ohio St. 263, 147 N.E.2d 663(1958). See MUNICIPAL CORPoRATIoNS section, supra.
23. City of Columbus v. County of Delaware, 164 Ohio St. 605, 132 N.E.2d 747
(1956). Justice Taft in writing the opinion for the court sought to distinguish this
fact situation from the 1945 situation in the Cleveland Transit System decision.
24. City of Columbus v. County of Franklin, 167 Ohio St. 256, 147 N.E.2d 625(1958).
25. OHIo REV. CODE § 717.05.
26. In State ex rel., Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 8, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951)
the court had decided that off-street parking facilities could be acquired under home
19591
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PERSONAL PROPERTY
Tangibles
The determination of the proper classification of tangible property for
personal property assessment creates perennial controversies. A few
years ago the question of the proper classification of machinery used in
the preparation of frozen dessert27 resulted -in a holding that the ma-
chinery was used in manufacturing and should be assessed under the
50% rule. Recently the matter of the proper classification of coin vend-
ing machines which dispensed carbonated-beverage drinks and hot coffee
was settled in favor of "use in manufacturing." 28  As in the case of the
frozen dessert machine which produced a palatable frozen product, these
dispensing machines mixed the ingredients of their respective products
and dispensed them to the buyer as a finished ready-to-drink product. The
Tax Commissioner had contended that these machines were used in mer-
chandising and should therefore be assessed under the 70% rule.
In Adams v. Bowers,2 '9 the taxpayers, owners and operators of a scrap-
,iron yard, used a 10% rate (i.e. 10 year depreciation period) in valuing
their scrap iron yard equipment for purposes of the personal property
tax. The Tax Commissioner had previously promulgated a 5% depre-
ciation rate (20-year life) for personal property used in the scrap-metal
industry, and in this case he reduced the rate thereby increasing the assess-
ment for each of the prior three years. On appeal to the Board of Tax
Appeals this decision was affirmed. The Supreme Court in turn af-
firmed the Board's decision, holding that it was neither unreasonable nor
unlawful for the Board to apply a rate of depreciation on the scrap-iron
yard equipment based on a 20-year life. Obviously the taxpayer had
failed to produce evidence of the unreasonableness of 20-year life as ap-
plied to the specific property involved.
Three cases determined the validity of assessments upon the producer
of wheat which was stored either in grain elevators or on the farm pur-
suant to the producer's note and loan agreements made prior to the Jan-
uary 1 tax-listing day for personal property and which were not listed
by the taxpayer. The first case was concerned with whether the tax-
payers were the owners of wheat stored under note and loan agreements
rule powers, but the principal decision indicates that "the uniform operation of all
laws of a general nature provision" of OHIO CONST. Art II, § 26 renders it impos-
sible to allow a municipality acquiring real estate through home rule powers to claim
exemption of the real estate of its parking facility under OHIo REV. CODE § 5709.08.
27. Jer-Zee, Inc. v. Bowers, 163 Ohio St. 31, 125 N.E.2d 195 (1955).
28. Canteen Co. v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 337, 148 N.E.2d 684 (1958).
29. 167 Ohio St. 389, 148 N.E.2d 920 (1958).
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owned and held by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Tht other two
cases were concerned with the Revised Code definition of "used"30 as
amended in 1955 to exclude agricultural products in storage which are
subject to control of the United States government and which are to be
shipped on order of the United States government. The Supreme Court
held in all three cases that agricultural products placed in storage as
security for the producer's note and loan agreement owned and held
by the Commodity Credit Corporation are not property of the producer
taxable under the Revised Code 3' in its original form or as amended in
1955.
Ten other appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals were consolidated
in Grennell Corp. v. Bowers3 2 and involved the application of the "held
in storage" provisions of the Revised Code3s as they existed prior to the
1955 amendment.3 4 Because of the major change in meaning of "storage"
in the "used" definition of personal property effected -in 1955, a detailed
discussion of the decisions of these appeals does not seemed warranted.3 5
Intangibles
Two Supreme Court decisions dealt with the matter of documents or
other written agreements concerning real property 'being intangible per-
sonal property taxable as intangibles and not evidence of an -interest in
land excepted from the intangible property tax.36 In the first of these
30. Orro Rnv. CODE § 5701.08.
31. Omo REv. CoDE § 5701.08. Goodrich v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 403, 149
N.E.2d 248 (1958). The three cases consolidated in this decision are Maddox, Good-
rich and Grener. In the preceding discussion the Maddox case is referred to as the
"first case." The "last two cases" refer to the Goodrich and Grener appeals which
are concerned with taxes due January 1, 1956 and involve a construction of OHIo
REV. CODE § 5701.08 as amended in 1955.
32. 167 Ohio St 267, 147 N.E.2d 657 (1958).
33. Omio REv. CODE § 5709.01 provided that all personal property located and
used in business in this state, regardless of the residence of the owners, was subject
to taxation. The definition of "used" in § 5701.08 included personal property
stored or kept on hand as material, parts, products or merchandise and excluded non-
residents merchandise if held in a storage warehouse for storage only.
34. The definition of "used" as set out in OIo REv. CODE § 5701.08 since the
1955 amendment now excludes only "merchandise or agriculture products shipped
from outside of this state and held in this state in a warehouse or a place of storage
for storage only and for shipment outside of this state."
35. The court held that personal property cannot under the former definition of
used be considered as held for "storage only" in any of the following instances: (1)
where it is located at the place where it is to be used in manufacturing; (2) where
it is located at the place where it was manufactured into a product; (3) where it is
located at the place from which it is in effect to be delivered by the taxpayer directly
to a customer.
36. Omo REv.CODE§ 5701.06 (C) (1).
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cases the evidence of the property interest was an interest-bearing contract
for the sale of real estate. The court held this contract taxable under
the intangible tax. 7 A majority of the court were of the opinion that a
contract for the sale of land carrying an interest charge is an interest-
bearing obligation for the payment of mone 3  and not exempt from
tax.
In the other case the taxpayer owned a block of stock in a corporation
which owned an apartment building. There were four separate apart-
ments in this building and the stock was divided into four blocks which
were owned by the four occupants. A majority of the court were of the
opinion that each shareholder in effect bought an interest in real estate
for the sole purpose of occupying a portion of it as a home and that
there was not investment in a profit-sharing venture. These shares of
stock 9 were not investments as defined in the statute,40 and therefore
not taxable.
In Society for Saving v. Bowers,41 the Supreme Court of the United
States held invalid as a tax on the bank, a statute which purported to tax
the ownership interests of the depositors in mutual savings banks, the
capital of which is not divided into shares or which have no capital
stock. After this decision the Ohio General Assembly amended 42 the
applicable statutes43 seeking to supply the deficiencies of the former stat-
utes by specifically taxing the ownership interests of the depositors of
these institutions, expressly assessing these interests as distinguished from
the capital or property of the institution, by authorizing the institutions
which pay the tax to deduct the amount from the deposits, and by creat-
ing a lien on behalf of the institution and the state upon the depositors'
ownership interests.
In Second Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Cleveland v. Bowers,"
the Supreme Court sustained an assesment against the "ownership inter-
ests of the depositors" based upon the surplus (reserve) and undivided
profits without the deduction of the value of federal securities owned by
37. Smilack v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 216, 147 N.E.2d 499 (1958).
38. OIno REv. CODE 5 5701.06 (B).
39. Justus v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 384, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
40. OHIIO REv. CODE § 5701.06 (A).
41. 349 U.S. 143 (1955). See discussion, 1955 Survey, 7 WEST. REV. L. REv.
328 (1956).
42. 126 Ohio Laws, pt. 2, p. 12.
43. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 5709.02, 5719.09, 5719.10, 5725.04, 5725.07.
44. 168 Ohio St. 65, 151 N.E.2d 223 (1958). In affirming the decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court's opinion stated that the General Assem-
bly had expressly supplied all of the deficiencies which the United States Supreme
Court found in the then existing statutes.
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the Association, thereby upholding the validity of the newly refurbished
taxing provisions. The Association had in its 1957 return listed no book
value of capital employed because it held federal securities of a value in
excess of the capital employed.
Sales and Use Taxation
In 1952 the Ohio Supreme Court4 5 held that mats, engravings, etch-
ings, half-tones and similar materials purchased -by a business concern and
then delivered by it without charge to a newspaper publisher for inci-
dental use in newspaper advertisements concerning its merchandise were
not used directly in making retail sales within the exemption provisions
of the sales tax statute4 The identical question was again presented to
the court -through an appeal from a Board of Tax Appeal's denial of
exemption to sales of the same kind of materials for the same purpose.
In Zinc Engravers v. Bowers,47 the court reversed the decision of the
Board of Tax Appeals as being unreasonable and unlawful, and held that
these -items were used directly in making retail sales. Another issue pre-
sented on this appeal concerned the detail with which a blanket certifi-
cate of exemption filed by the purchaser with the vendor must describe
the exempted artides. The court stated that a longhand identification of
the material under which exemption might reasonably be claimed meets
the statutory 8 requirement of indicating that the sale is not legally sub-
ject to the tax.
Two decisions reviewed the action of the Board of Tax Appeals in
assessing property under the Ohio use tax. In both cases the taxpayer was
claiming an exemption4 9 based on the direct use of property in manu-
facturing or processing. An unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade
the Supreme Court to accept the "integrated plane' theory of use in de-
termining the exemption of the component parts of a batching plant as
the term is used in the ready-mix concrete business. The court again
refused to accept this theory and applied the test of actual use "during and
in the manufacturing or processing period. '50  Thus such items as in-
gredient storage bins, the conveyor, and a lift truck used in handling ma-
45. Eider & Johnston Co. v. Glander, 156 Ohio St. 445, 103 N.E.2d 392 (1952).
See the third paragraph of the syllabus.
46. OHIO RE. CoDE § 5739.01 (E) (2).
47. 168 Ohio St 43, 151 N.E.2d 226 (1958).
48. OHIo REv. CODE 5 5739.03.
49. OMO REV. CODE 5741.01 (C) (2). This definition is identical with the
sales tax definition set out in § 5739.01 (E) (2).
50. Youngstown Building Material & Fuel Co. v. Bowers, 167 Ohio St. 363, 149
N.X.2d 1 (1958).
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terials were not used during the processing and consequently not exempt.
On the other hand, steam generators which were used in cold weather
to heat water used in mixing and to provide live steam for better mixing
ingredients were used during the processing period and were therefore
exempt.
A court of appeals decision dealt with the exemption51 of
coal mining machinery for an Ohio mine which was used primarily for
producing commercial grades of coal and slack for sale in the open market
but which was also used for the production of slack to be supplied to a
co-subsidiary. In holding the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals un-
reasonable in sustaining a use tax assessment on the mining machinery,
the court of appeals 52 determined that te exemption applied where the
principal purpose in the operation of the mine was the production of
higher grades of coal for sale at a profit.
Inheritance Taxation
In In re Estate of Sherick,53 the Supreme Court determined the class
to which a succession belongs which comes by way of the so-called "Half-
and-Half' statute.54 Under the facts of this case the succession was to
identical realty which had passed by will from the successor's father to
his stepmother who had died intestate and without issue. In such a situa-
tion the son and only lineal descendant of his father took a one-half
interest in this identical real property. In reversing the court of appeals
and the court of probate, the Supreme Court held that the succession came
from the relict spouse, the stepmother, and not from the father. Under
the inheritance tax statute this placed the succession in the highest or
fourth class as to tax rates.r 5
Another decision56 determined that the executors of a decedent who
had succeeded to a life estate under the terms of a will and had paid an
inheritance tax based upon a life expectancy of approximately 10 years
could not secure a refund when the decedent life tenant actually enjoyed
the limited interest for only four years and eleven months. The court
51. See OHIO REV. CODE § 5741.01 (C) (2). There is also an identical defini-
tion under sales tax 5 5739.01(E) (2).
52. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Bowers, 104 Ohio App. 325, 148 N.E.2d 706
(1956).
53. 167 Ohio St. 151, 146 N.E.2d 727 (1957).
54. OHIo REv. CODE § 2105.10.
55. OHIo REv. CoDE § 5731.12. While not an issue in the present case, it neces-
sarily follows that a succession under the "half-and-half" statute from a step-parent
who has not "adopted," the child of the predeceased spouse falls outside the three
exempt classes and this successor is not entitled to any exemption under § 5731.09.
56. In re Hough's Estate, 152 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
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held that there was no abridgement, defeat or diminution of the dece-
dent's limited estate within the meaning of the statute.5 Unless the life
estate is terminated prior to the valuation of the estate and determination
of the tax,58 the death of the life tenant prior to an actuarially determined
life expectancy upon which the valuation is based does not affect the
amount of the inheritance tax on that succession.
A court of appeals decision dealt with the applicability of the charita-
ble exemption provisions as applied to a succession to an out-of-state
children's home which provided a foster home for a substantial number
(over one third of its group) of children from Ohio, and about 90%
of this care was uncompensated. The court applied a rule of strict con-
struction and held that this home, located in Indiana, did not qualify as
a public charity carried on in substantial part within Ohio.5 9 Nor could
the "home" qualify as an "institution of learning" or a "public hospital."' 0
Two decisions related to the problem of the deductibility of debts of
the estate: In In Re Shaafs Estate,61 realty co-owned by decedent and
her surviving spouse was subject to a note and mortgage signed by both.
In determining the inheritance tax only one-half of the amount of the
debt was allowed as a claim against the estate. The executor excepted to
this determination, and upon hearing the exception the probate court held
that the full amount of the claim against the realty could be, allowed
against the estate. At the same time the court determined that the right
of contribution from the survivor of one-half of the amount due should
be listed as an asset of the estate.
The other case involved the determination of the inheritance tax
upon a succession consisting of non-probate assets, a portion of which the
successor used to pay certain obligations of the estate, including funeral
expenses. The successor-widow contended that the use of non-probate
assets to pay the valid debts of the estates rendered the succession value-
less to that extent and therefore to the extent that the succession was used
to pay debts it should not be subjected to that tax. The Supreme Court
held62 that the tax applied to the right to receive the property, and when
57. OIo REV. CODE § 5731.23.
58. The only statutory exception to the determination of value under OHio REV.
CODE § 5731.23 is provided by § 5731.27 which substitutes the actual amount paid
or payable to the life tenant or annuitant when the duration of the estate or annuity
has become fixed prior to the determination of the tax.
59. OHIO REV. CODE § 5731.09 sets forth all the exemptions.
60. In re Parish's Estate, 153 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
61. 152 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio P. Ct. 1956). The full amount of the indebtedness
secured by the joint note and mortgage was $60,000, and the claim constituting an
asset of the estate was listed at $30,000.
62. In re Estate of Chadwick, 167 Ohio St. 373, 149 N.E.2d 5 (1958).
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there is no legal liability of the successor to use the non-probate assets to
pay the debts of the decedent, the amount of the debts actually paid
may not be deducted from the value of the succession.63
Municipal Income Taxation
A non-resident owner of rental property located in the City of
Columbus brought an action for a declaratory judgment seeking to hold
the municipal income tax invalid as to profits from the realty rentals. In
the court of appeals 64 one of the principal contentions of the taxpayer
was that tax on the income from real property was in effect a property
tax, and since the state had already levied a tax on the real estate, it had
thereby pre-empted the field.65  In affirming the judgment of the trial
court, 66 the court of appeals held that a municipality had the power to
levy an income tax under its power to levy excise taxes to raise revenue
for purely local taxes,67 that the state had not pre-empted this field of
taxation,"" and that the tax was not discriminatory against non-residents.
Appeals From the Board of Tax Appeals
Under the Ohio Statute,6 9 if the reviewing court decides that the
Board of Tax Appeals' decision is unreasonable or unlawful, it shall re-
verse and vacate the decision or modify it and enter final judgment in
accordance with the modification. This appeals provision is equally ap-
63. In the dissenting opinion of Judge Taft there is a strenuous argument that the
inheritance tax reaches only the beneficial interest of the successor. The nonprobate
assets included $10,000 of joint and survivorship U. S. bonds, and the minority con-
tended the $500 exempt from administration, all the expenses of administration,
funeral expenses, and the widow's allowance be deductible from the gross value of
these assets before determining the value for the succession tax.
64. Benua v. City of Columbus, 152 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
65. This argument was predicated upon the famous U. S. Supreme Court case of
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), holding that a tax
on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax under the federal constitution.
The court of appeals properly pointed out that the Supreme Court had held in New
York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) that the receipt of income by a
resident is a taxable event, even though the income be received from real estate lo-
cated in another state.
66. The trial court opinion is reported in Benua v. City of Columbus, 147 N.E.2d
148 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
67. For this the court relied upon Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St.
58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
68. Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St., 179, 91 N.B.2d 250 (1950) was con-
sidered strong authority against preemption. Ohio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo,
163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955) was properly distinguished on its facts
and the nature of the property (intangibles).
69. OHIO REV. CODE § 5717.04.
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plicable to taxpayers and any other person affected by the Board's de-
cisions, including public agencies. A recent Supreme Court decision 70
reversed the Board's determination in an allocation order which concerned
the proceeds of the classified property taxes to be allotted to the cities, the
county and the public libraries in Ross County. The Supreme Court
found that the Board had acted both unreasonably and unlawfully in
making the allocations in question.
Two Code sections,71 authorizing appeals to the Board of Tax Appeals,
vest a discretion in the Board to make "such investigation concerning the
appeals as it deems proper." In a recent case, the Board affirmed an
order of the Tax Commissioner determining the value of appellants
common stock for intangible personal property tax purposes. During the
course of the hearing before the Board, it developed that the interested
parties failed to present evidence on one important factor often used in
determining value. The Board's entry indicates that it resorted to its
"broad investigatory powers" to supply this deficiency, and the entry fur-
ther indicates that it used the results of this investigation in arriving
at its affirming decision. This evidence was not set out in the record
certified -by the board to the court of appeals. The Board's action re-
garding this apparently significant evidence was highly prejudicial and
amounted to a denial of due process. Its decision was therefore unlawful
and the cause was remanded to the Board for revaluation. 2 It is dear
from this decision that the "broad investigational powers" vested in the
Board do not authorize the Board to consider evidence not set out in the
record. Knowledge to the appellant of the alleged facts together with
an opportunity to explain or refute them is essential prior to a decision of
the Board.
Priority of Federal Tax Lien
Under federal law the general lien7" of the United States for taxes
arises at the time the assessment is made.74 This general lien is valid,
even without its filing by the proper United States official, against all
other liens, except those mentioned in the federal statute: mortgagees,
pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors.75 In Short v. Peoples Bank,7O
70. Board of Trustees v. Ross County Budget Com'n, 168 Ohio St. 108, 151
N.E.2d 260 (1958).
71. OHIO REy. CODES §§ 5717.01 (appeal from county board of revisions) and
5717.02 (appeals from the final determination of the tax commissioner).
72. Decker v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Ohio App. 493, 146 NE.2d 127 (1957).
73. INT. Rav. CODBOF 1954, 56321.
74. IbT. Ruv. CoDE OF 1954, 5 6322.
75. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
76. 105 Ohio App. 80, 151 N.2d 47 (1957).
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